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Abstract
We provide empirical evidence on the eects of tax liability changes in the United
States. We make a distinction between “surprise” and “anticipated” tax shocks. Surprise
tax cuts give rise to a large boom in the economy. Anticipated tax liability tax cuts are
instead associated with a contraction in output, investment and hours worked prior to
their implementation. After their implementation, anticipated tax liability cuts lead to
an economic expansion. We build a DSGE model with changes in tax rates that may
be anticipated or not, estimate key parameters using a simulation estimator and show
that it can account for the main features of the data. We argue that tax shocks are
empirically important for U.S. business cycles and that the Reagan tax cut, which was
largely anticipated, was a main factor behind the early 1980’s recession.
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This paper investigates the dynamic eects on the aggregate economy of changes in taxes. We
study U.S. time series data and derive estimates of adjustment of key macroeconomic aggregates
to changes in tax liabilities. We confront a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with
the empirical evidence and examine whether it can account for the way in which changes in tax
liabilities aect the U.S. economy. A key aspect of our analysis is that we make a distinction
between unanticipated and anticipated changes in taxes. Anticipated tax liability changes are
relevant empirically because ﬁscal interventions frequently are associated with implementation
lags. Moreover, given the fact that the time lag between the announcements of tax liability
interventions and their implementation are at least partially observable, tax liability changes
provide an interesting testing-ground for examining how anticipation eects may give rise to
ﬂuctuations in the economy.
Our empirical analysis makes use of Romer and Romer’s (2007a) narrative account of U.S. tax
liability changes. These authors identify 49 “signiﬁcant” legislated federal tax policy initiatives,
many of which consist of multiple separate tax liability changes, during the post World War II
period. We focus on the tax liability changes that Romer and Romer (2007a) deem exogenous.
We use information on the dates at which the changes in tax liabilities were legislated and on the
dates at which the tax liabilities were introduced in order to discriminate between unanticipated
and unanticipated tax policy interventions. We categorize tax policy changes as anticipated if
the dierence between the date at which they were signed by the President and the date at which
they were implemented was more than 90 days. In practice, this means that all the anticipated
tax changes in our sample have at least two quarters of anticipation.
We examine the responses of key aggregate variables to tax liability changes using a vector
autoregression (VAR) approach. We ﬁnd that unanticipated decreases in tax liabilities give rise to
substantial expansions in aggregate output, consumption of nondurables and services, purchases
of consumer durables, investment, and an increase in aggregate hours worked. The boom in
the economy is persistent and reaches its maximum impact around 2.5 years after decreases
1in tax liabilities. At this horizon, a one percent decrease in tax liabilities gives rise to a 2.2
percent increase in output per capita, a 1.1 percent increase in private sector consumption of
nondurables and services per capita, a 7.3 percent increase in consumer durable purchases, a 7.6
percent increase in private sector investment, and a 1.1 percent increase in hours worked.
A key ﬁnding is that anticipated tax liability decreases are associated with major contractions
in the economy in the period prior to its implementation. The contraction occurs in output,
hours worked and is especially sharp for investment that falls by almost 5 percent in response
to a 1 percent anticipated tax liability decrease which we assume is announced 6 quarters in
advance. Consumption of nondurables and services instead reacts little to the announcement
of lower taxes and displays a ﬂat proﬁle throughout the pre-implementation period. Once the
tax cut is implemented, however, the economy reacts much the same way to anticipated and
unanticipated tax decreases.
These results are consistent with Romer and Romer (2007b) who ﬁnd that output contracts
in reaction to an anticipation of future tax cuts, but booms in reaction to implemented tax
cuts. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) ﬁnd little anticipation eects of tax policy changes but
focus on very short anticipation horizons.1 Consistently with their results, we show that the
pre-implementation contraction is smaller the shorter is the implementation lag. However, in
the U.S. data, the typical pre-implementation lag (around 1.5 - 2 years), is associated with a
signiﬁcant pre-implementation contraction.
We then construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with ﬁscal policy. Output
is produced by competitive ﬁrms. Households consume nondurables and durables and rent out
labor and capital to ﬁrms in the production sector. The government taxes capital income and
labor income and uses the proceeds to ﬁnance government spending and lump sum transfers to
the household sector. Income tax rates are assumed to be stochastic but changes in them may
be either anticipated or unanticipated. We estimate the key parameters of the model using a
simulation estimator which imposes a VAR structure on the model data when matching it with
the empirical impulse response functions. We ﬁnd that the model can account very well for the
1Their focus on short anticipation lags is dictated mostly by their identiﬁcation strategy.
2main features of the U.S. data. In particular, the model accounts with a high degree of accuracy
for both the expansionary eects of implemented tax changes and for the pre-implementation
slump in the economy in response to pre-announced tax cuts.
Our empirical results complement earlier studies that have examined how anticipated tax
changes aect the economy. Examining U.S. household consumption expenditure data, Poterba
(1988) tests whether consumption reacts to announcements of future tax changes and fails to
ﬁnd robust evidence in favor of this hypothesis.2 Using household level data from the Consumer
Expenditure Survey, Parker (1999) and Souleles (1999, 2002) study how consumption responds
to actual changes in taxes when these were known in advance of their implementation.3 These
authors ﬁnd signiﬁcant impact of anticipated tax changes at the implementation dates. These
results are usually interpreted as evidence of lack of forward looking behavior, the presence
of binding liquidity constraints or other aspects that prevent consumers from adjusting their
consumption plans in advance in response to predictable changes in income. Our empirical
results are consistent with this earlier literature, but we show that the lack of a strong response
of consumption to announcements about future taxes, and the response of consumption to actual
changes in taxes when these were pre-announced, are not necessarily inconsistent with a DSGE
model that abstracts from liquidity constraints and that assumes rational expectations.
The idea that the economy might adjust prior to the introduction of pre-announced tax
liability changes bears similarities with the “news” views of business cycles of Pigou (1927) as
recently revived by e.g. Beaudry and Portier (2004, 2006), Cochrane (1994), Danthine, Donaldson
and Johnsen (1998), den Haan and Kaltenbrunner (2006), or Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006). An
important obstacle to empirical tests for news driven business cycle is that expectations are
inherently di!cult to estimate as they are unobserved by the econometrician. However, in
2Poterba (1988) identiﬁes ﬁve such episodes: February 1964, June 1968, March 1975, August 1981, and August
1986. We exclude the second and third of these episodes because Romer and Romer (2007a) categorize these tax
changes as endogenous.
3Parker (1999) examines the impact of Social Security changes during the 1980’s while Souleles (2002) inves-
tigates the Reagan tax cut of the early 1980’s.
3the application to tax changes one can reasonably assume that agents (and econometricians) are
informed about pre-announced tax liability changes. Therefore, our ﬁnding that a pre-announced
tax cut gives rise to a pre-implementation contraction in the economy may be important for
understanding how news shocks help shape ﬂuctuations in the economy.
Finally, we ask whether tax liability changes are important impulses to the U.S. business
cycle. We examine this issue on the basis of a counterfactual analysis in which we simulate the
path of the U.S. economy in response to tax liability changes assuming that there were no other
shocks to the economy. We ﬁnd that changes in tax liabilities are very signiﬁcant impulses to
the U.S. business cycles. Together anticipated and unanticipated tax shocks can account for 43
percent of the standard deviation of output at business cycle frequencies and for 47 percent of the
standard deviation of investment. Moreover, we show that the eects of anticipated tax shocks
account for a large fraction of the early 1980’s recession.
2 Empirical Evidence
In this section we analyze of the impact of anticipated and unanticipated tax shocks in the U.S.
For this purpose, we make use of Romer and Romer’s (2007a) narrative account of U.S. tax
liability changes. These authors identify 49 signiﬁcant legislated federal tax acts in the period
1947-2006.4 Since tax acts often consist of multiple separate pieces of tax liability changes, a
total of 104 separate changes in tax liabilities are identiﬁed. Romer and Romer (2007) categorize
each of the tax liability changes according to whether they were endogenous responses to the
state of the economy or to government ﬁnancial needs, or whether they were introduced due to
long term growth or deﬁcit objectives. We built our empirical approach upon the assumption
that the tax liability changes can be regarded as exogenous shocks that are orthogonal to other
structural shocks. For that reason we focus only upon those tax liability changes that Romer
4The main sources of information used by Romer and Romer (2007a) are the Economic Report of the President,
the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of Finances, the Budget of the United States
Government, and presidential speeches.
4and Romer (2007a) classify as “exogenous due to long-term growth objectives” or exogenous due
to “deﬁcit concerns”. The former of these are tax changes that were introduced without any
explicit concerns about the state of the economy while the latter are identiﬁed as tax changes
introduced to address inherited budget deﬁcits not due to contemporaneous spending concerns.
These two types of tax liability changes, according to Romer and Romer’s (2007a) identiﬁcation,
were thus introduced regardless of their potential eects on the current state of the economy.
This classiﬁcation, we believe, allows us to assume that the tax liability changes that we focus
upon can be assumed orthogonal to other structural shocks. This selection leaves us with 67 tax
liability changes stemming from 34 dierent federal tax policy acts which we list in Table A.1.
Romer and Romer (2007a) identify both the dates at which the tax legislations were signed
by the President and the dates at which the tax liability changes were implemented. We use this
information to dierentiate between anticipated and unanticipated tax liability tax changes. We
deﬁne a tax liability change as anticipated i ft h et i m el a gb e t w e e nt h ed a t ea tw h i c ht h el e g i s l a t i o n
was signed by the President and the date of its implementation was above 90 days. In practise,
this implies that all the tax liability changes that we deem anticipated are associated with at least
2 quarters of anticipation. Tax acts with a shorter implementation lag are deﬁned to be surprise
tax cuts (and their timing is set according to the date of implementation). Our assumption
regarding the minimum anticipation lag helps ensure that the results are too sensitive to the
exact timing of the legislation within a quarter.5 Based on this taxonomy, 36 of the tax liability
changes are deemed anticipated and 31 are deﬁned as surprise tax shocks. We illustrate the
resulting tax shocks in Figure 1 measured in terms of percentages of GDP. The top panel shows
the unanticipated shocks and the middle panel the anticipated shocks dated by the quarter of
implementation. The bottom panel shows the anticipation horizon of the anticipated tax shocks
measured in quarters (truncated at 4 years)
The Kennedy and the Reagan tax initiatives were associated with major anticipated tax
5Romer and Romer (2007b) use a similar approach to measuring expected tax liability changes. Lustig, Sleet
and Yeltekin (2007) use information on “abnormal” return to measure expected government defense spending
shocks.
5changes. The Kennedy tax initiative, the Revenue Act of 1964, was signed in February 1964 and
incorporated tax liability changes implemented in the second quarter of 1964, the third quarter
of 1964 and the ﬁrst quarter of 1965. The former and largest of these is classiﬁed as a surprise
change, while the latter two are classiﬁed as anticipated changes. The Economic Recovery Act
of 1981, passed by Congress in August 1981 during the ﬁrst Reagan administration, consisted
of ﬁve separate changes in tax liabilities which were due in 1981:3 (a 0.84 percent cut), 1981:4
(a 0.56 percent increase), 1982:1 (a 1.53 percent cut), 1983:1 (a 1.69 percent cut), and 1984:1
(a 1.28 percent cut). The ﬁrst two of these initiatives are deﬁned as surprise cuts according to
our taxonomy while the last three initiatives are deﬁned as anticipated policy changes. This
sequence of Reagan tax cuts as a whole constitutes by far the largest anticipated tax changes in
the sample that we study.
The anticipation lags - the dierences in the timing between the implementation of the antic-
ipated tax changes and the date at which they were signed by the the President - dier substan-
tially across the tax legislations (see the bottom panel of Figure 1). The median anticipation lag
is 6 quarters. The largest anticipation lag is associated with the Social Security Amendments of
1983 which was signed by the President in April 1983 but had tax liability changes taking place
as far out in the future as 1990.
We assume that the date at which the public becomes informed about the changes in tax
liabilities coincides with the date at which the legislations were passed by Congress. It is per-
ceivable that in some instances the public might have expected the tax changes prior to the date
at which they were signed by the the President. Indeed, many U.S. presidential elections have
been fought over tax policies. Our approach therefore, if anything, underestimates the extent to
which tax policy changes were anticipated.6
6A related issue concerns our implicit assumption that the tax liability changes are fully credible. One might
worry about the extent to which the private sector ascribes some likelihood to the possibility that subsequent tax
liability changes might not cancel out, or reduce, pre-announced initiatives. If such doubts about credibility are
relevant, it should be harder for us to ﬁnd evidence of anticipation eects.
62.1 Empirical Approach
We study U.S. quarterly data for the sample period 1947:1 - 2006:4. The starting point of our
analysis is the following VAR:
[w = D + Ew+ F (O)[w31 + G(O)
x







w+l>w + hw (1)
where [w =[ {1w>==>{Qw]
0 is a vector of endogenous variables, D and E control for a constant
terms and a linear trend, F (O) is S-order lag polynomial, G(O) and I (O) are (U +1 ) -order
lag polynomials. x
w denotes surprise tax liability changes implemented at date w,a n dd
w+l>w
denotes tax liability changes known at date w and implemented at date w + l.T h e t a x s h o c k s
are measured by the tax liability changes divided by aggregate U.S. GDP (at the time of their
implementation). This contrasts with the standard “dummy variable” measurement of the policy
interventions usually adopted in the narrative approach, see e.g. Ramey and Shapiro (1998).7
Our approach imposes a linearity constraint on the measurement of the tax shock but allows
us to aggregate the evidence on the eects of tax shocks across dierent episodes. Romer and
Romer (2007b) adopt the same measurement of the size of the tax policy shocks.
Equation (1) includes the current values and U lags of the tax changes implemented at w.W e
allow for dierential eects of the implemented tax liability changes depending on whether they
are categorized as surprise tax changes or as anticipated tax changes. To allow for persistence in
the tax liability changes, the VAR includes the lagged values of x
w and d
w>w.
The eects of anticipated tax liability changes are captured through the coe!cient vectors
J1  JN where NA1 denotes the maximum announcement horizon that we allow for. Our
measure of d











w3m>w+l denotes tax liability changes announced at date wm ( w i t ha ni m p l e m e n t a t i o nl a g
of l+m periods) to be implemented at date w+l (subject to l+m  2). P denotes the maximum
7Perotti (2007) provides an insightful survey of the literature that has examined the consequences of government
spending shocks using the narrative approach.
7implementation lag observed in the data. Therefore, d
w+l>w aggregates together tax changes based
on their remaining implementation lag. Ideally, we would like to consider separately anticipated
tax changes of dierent announcement horizons but such an approach is not feasible given the
implied loss of degrees of freedom.
The responses to the anticipated tax liability shocks during the pre-implementation period
are purely expectational in nature. In order to examine their importance we examine the impulse
responses to the two types of tax liability changes. From these we evaluate the importance of
expectations regarding future tax liability changes on the basis of the response to the tax shock
during the pre-implementation horizon.
We consider the following set of endogenous variables:
[w =

|w>f w>g w>l w>k w
¸0
where |w denotes the logarithm of U.S. GDP per adult in constant (chained) prices, fw is the
logarithm of the real private sector consumption expenditure on nondurables and services per
capita, gw is the logarithm of private sector consumption expenditure on durables per capita, lw is
the logarithm of real aggregate gross investment per capita. kw is the logarithm of average hours
worked per adult. Precise deﬁnitions and data sources are given in Table A.2 in the appendix.
2.2 Empirical Results
Consistent with the median anticipation lag in the data that we study, we assume that N =6 .
In order to allow for persistence in the tax changes, we assume that G(O) and I (O) are 12
order lag polynomials. We assume that S =1(but the results are robust to assuming longer
lag structures). We report the impulse response functions to a one percentage point increase in
the tax liabilities along with 68 percent (non-parametric) non-centered bootstrapped conﬁdence
intervals.8 The impulse response functions are shown for a forecast horizon of 24 quarters for
unanticipated tax liability shocks, and for 6 quarters before the tax cut is implemented to 24
quarters after its implementation in the case of anticipated shocks.
8The conﬁdence intervals are computed from 10000 replications.
8Figure 2 illustrates the impact of the two types of tax liability changes. The left column
reports the results for an unanticipated tax liability cut. The decrease in taxes sets o am a j o r
boom in the economy and the eects are very persistent. The responses of all the endogenous
variables follow hump shaped dynamics. Investment and consumer durables purchases display
by far the largest elasticity to the cut in tax liabilities. Upon impact, investment increases by
around 1 percentage point and continues to rise until 11 quarters after the change in tax liabilities
where it peaks at 7.6 percent above trend. Consumer durables purchases respond much the same
w a ya si n v e s t m e n ta n dp e a k sa t7 . 2 5p e r c e n ta b o v et r e n d1 0q u a r t e r sa f t e rt h et a xc u t .
Along with the increase in investment and consumer durables, output and hours worked
also increase. Output rises upon impact and increases gradually until a peak increase of 2.17
percent is reached 11 quarters after the change in taxes. The impact on hours worked, instead,
is estimated to be close to zero until around a year and a half after the change in taxes. After
that, hours worked increase gradually and peak at 1.16 percent above trend 12 quarters after the
tax shock.
The impact on consumption of nondurables and purchases of durable consumption goods is
qualitatively dierent from the other variables. In particular, the increase in private consump-
tion occurs earlier than in the other variables in the VAR and after 6 quarters, the impact on
consumption is basically ﬂat over most of the forecast period. The peak response of consumption
(a 1.07 percent rise above trend) is reached 7 quarters after the decrease in tax liabilities, i.e.
around 1 year earlier than the peak responses of output, investment, and hours worked. The size
and persistence of the responses of the endogenous variables to the unanticipated tax liability
changes reveal that ﬁscal policy may be an important impulse to the U.S. business cycle.
The responses to unanticipated tax liability changes that we derive from the VAR in equation
(1) are similar to the results of Romer and Romer (2007b). These authors, like us, examine the
response of the economy to tax liability changes. Although they do not discriminate between
anticipated and unanticipated shocks, Romer and Romer (2007b) ﬁnd large and protracted re-
sponses to changes in tax liabilities. Relative to Blanchard and Perotti (2002), the response of
output to tax liability shocks occur more gradually than the output response to the tax shock
9that these authors identify with a structural VAR approach. However, our results are similar to
theirs in terms of the persistence of the output response.
In the right column of Figure 2 we show the responses of [w to anticipated tax liability changes.
There is strong evidence in favor of anticipation eects: The anticipation of a future tax liability
reduction sets o a recession in the economy that lasts until the tax cut is eventually implemented.
We ﬁnd that output drops by up to 1.16 percent with the largest drop taking place 3 quarters
before the tax liability cut is implemented. The decrease in output is statistically signiﬁcant
from zero during much of the pre-implementation period. Similarly to output, hours worked
drop below trend throughout the announcement period peaking at 1.9 percent below trend 4
quarters before the tax cut. The most dramatic results pertain to investment which drops 4.9
percent below trend one year before the tax cut is implemented. Thus, not only does investment
react very elastically to surprise tax cuts, but the expectations eect is particularly relevant
for this variable. Common to all these variables is also that, when the tax cut is eventually
implemented, they are all below trend.
The response of private sector consumption of nondurables and services diers from the other
variables. The response of consumption is very mild during the pre-implementation period and,
at the time of implementation, consumption is back to trend. Consumers’ purchases of durable
goods drop by 3.3 percent 5 quarters before the tax cut but then return to trend before the tax
cut is implemented. Thus, the expectations eects aect consumption variables very dierently
from the other variables that we investigate.
Once the anticipated tax cut is implemented, we ﬁnd that the economy goes into a boom
period. Apart from hours worked, the up-take in activity actually occurs slightly faster than
in response to unanticipated tax cuts. At forecast horizons beyond two years, anticipated and
unanticipated changes in taxes have very similar eects. The maximum increase in output
(a 1.5 rise above trend) occurs 9 quarters after the tax cut is implemented, while investment
booms at 7.1 percent above trend (also 9 quarters after the cut in the taxes). As in the case of
unanticipated tax cuts, the consumption response is very ﬂat and reaches its new higher level
quickly (5 quarters after the tax cut). The response of hours worked is somewhat weaker than
10the other variables in the post-implementation period (and imprecisely estimated). The sizes of
the implementation-to-peak responses of the endogenous variables in response to the anticipated
tax cut are extremely similar to the peak impacts in response to the unanticipated tax cuts.
Thus, the main dierences between the response of the endogenous variables to an anticipated
and an unanticipated changes in taxes is that the peak response occurs earlier in the latter case.
Our approach to estimating the expectational eects gives strong support to the presence of
anticipation eects. Romer and Romer (2007b) examine instead if the expected present value
of future (but not yet implemented) tax changes aect the current level of key macroeconomic
aggregates. Like us they ﬁnd that the pre-implementation response is oppositely signed of the
post-implementation response. They conclude that there is mild evidence in favor of expecta-
tional eects. The advantage of our approach is that we analyze the full path of the adjustment
of the economy from when the tax liability changes are announced until several quarters after
its implementation.
It is also interesting to relate our results to the line of papers that have examined how an-
ticipated tax changes aect consumption choices. Poterba (1988) fails to derive a signiﬁcant
consumption response to announced future tax cuts while Parker (1999) and Souleles (2002) ﬁnd
that consumption react to the implementation of announced tax changes. These results are con-
sistent with ours given the lack of response of consumption of nondurables and services during
t h ep r e - i m p l e m e n t a t i o np e r i o da n dt h ei n c r e a s ei nc o n s u m p t i o nw h e nt h et a xc u ti si m p l e m e n t e d .
This evidence is often interpreted in terms of the presence of binding liquidity constraints, ir-
rationality or other factors that prevent households from changing their consumption streams
in response to forecastable changes in real income. However, we will show below that this dy-
namic response of consumption is consistent with a DSGE model that abstracts from liquidity
constraints and in which agents have rational expectations.
2.2.1 Sensitivity to the Anticipation Lag
The analysis above assumed a maximum anticipation horizon of 6 quarters. Recall that this
assumption implies that the information set used in the VAR includes future tax changes from
11a maximum 6 quarters before their implementation. We now examine the extent to which the
eects of anticipated changes in tax liabilities are sensitive to this assumption. Figure 3 illustrates
the impact of an anticipated tax liability cut when we vary N, the maximum anticipation horizon,
between 4 and 10 quarters.
The results are very robust to changes in N within the interval of values considered here.
Regardless of the value of N, the pre-implementation period is characterized by a recession
and once the tax cut is implemented, the economy goes into a boom. However, the depth of
the pre-implementation recession and the size of the post-implementation boom are sensitive
to N. In particular, the longer the assumed maximum anticipation horizon, the deeper is the
pre-implementation recession and the milder is the post-implementation expansion.
The sensitivity of the anticipation eects to the assumed length of the maximum anticipation
horizon reconciles our ﬁndings with those of Blanchard and Perotti (2002). These authors identify
output tax shocks using a structural VAR technique based on timing assumptions. They ﬁnd
little evidence of anticipation eects but allow only for a one quarter anticipation horizon.9
Our results indicate that for longer, and empirically relevant, anticipation horizons, there are
signiﬁcant pre-implementation eects of tax liability changes.
2.2.2 Stability
One potential worry about our results regarding the anticipation eects is that the results derive
from particular tax interventions in the sample and that the results are not representative of
how anticipated tax changes aect the economy. We now examine this issue by considering the
robustness of the results across alternative sample periods. We ﬁrst consider the sample period
1965:2 - 2006:4 which excludes the Kennedy tax initiative (the Revenue Act of 1964). Secondly,
we exclude the Bush tax initiatives (the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001 and the Jobs and Growth Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003) by excluding the last ﬁve years
o ft h es a m p l e .T h i r d ,w ee x c l u d et h eR e a g a nt a xc u t( t h eE c o n o m i cR e c o v e r yT a xA c to f1 9 8 1 ) .
This tax initiative occurs in the middle of the sample and is therefore a bit less straightforward
9This choice of a short anticipation horizon is dictated by their identiﬁcation strategy.
12to deal with. We consider the sample period 1947:4-1981:2 which therefore excludes the last 25
years of the sample.
Figure 4 shows the estimated response of output to anticipated and unanticipated tax liability
changes for the full sample period and the three alternative sample periods. The impact of
anticipated tax changes estimated for the full sample is basically identical to the estimates for
the samples where we eliminate either the Kennedy tax act of the Bush tax acts. Regardless of the
sample period, an unanticipated tax cut is associated with a large expansion in aggregate output.
The results are more sensitive to eliminating the last 25 years of the data. Using this sample
period, we ﬁnd much larger eects of anticipated tax cuts and we also ﬁnd that the expansion in
aggregate output following the implementation of an anticipated tax cut takes place somewhat
faster. Nevertheless, the presence of a pre-implementation contraction in the economy appears
to be extremely robust. Therefore, we conclude that the results that we have derived are robust
across the tax interventions in the sample.
3T h e o r y
We now examine whether a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with ﬁscal policy can
account for the empirical results derived above. We extend earlier DSGE models of distortionary
taxation such as Braun (1994) and McGrattan (1994)10 by introducing features such as habit
formation, consumer durables, and variable capacity utilization. The economy consists of house-
holds, ﬁrms, and a government. There is a continuum of identical inﬁnitely lived households with
rational expectations. Households own the factors of production which they rent out to the ﬁrms,
they purchase market goods and have access to a home-production technology which produces
consumption services from their holdings of durable consumption goods. Households pay taxes
on their factor income and receive government transfers. Firms are competitive and have access
to a constant returns to scale production function. The government purchases market goods,
taxes capital and labor income and makes lump-sum transfers to the household sector.
10See also Leeper and Yang, 2006, and Yang, 2005.
133.1 The Model
Households derive utility from consumption of goods and disutility from working. The consump-
tion bundle is an aggregate of the household’s purchases of nondurables and the service ﬂow
from the household’s stock of durable consumption goods. We allow for the presence of habit















where Hw denotes the mathematical expectations operator conditional on all information available
at date w.I ne q u a t i o n(3),  5 (0>1) denotes the subjective discount factor, A0 is a curvature
parameter, $A0 is a preference weight, and qv denotes the household’s labor supply. We assume
that labor is indivisible and that the household’s disutility from work grows at the rate of labor
augmenting technological progress.11








where  5 (0>1) is a share parameter,  5 [0>1) is a habit persistence parameter, and Fv
denotes consumption of consumer nondurables. The variable Kv denotes the service ﬂow from
the household’s stock of consumer durables. We assume that this service ﬂow from consumer





v  0 denotes the capacity utilization rate of the household’s stock of consumer durables.
The household faces a trade o in choosing the capacity utilization rate of the consumer durables
stock. A higher capacity utilization rate increases the instantaneous service ﬂow from its stock
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11This is reﬂected in our assumption that }v, the level of technology, enters the last term in the utility function.






consumer durables adjustment costs, y+[y (xy
v) is the gross rate of depreciation of the consumer
durables stock due to wear and tear of the consumer durables stock allowing for this to depend on
the utilization rate. We assume that x0
y>x00
y  0 and that xy (})=0where }  1 denotes the
rate of technological progress. This implies that adjustment costs are zero along the balanced
growth path. We also assume that [0
y>[00
y  0 and that [y (1) = 0.T h u s ,  captures the
depreciation rate of the stock of consumer durables when the capacity utilization rate is “normal”
which we normalize to xv =1 .
The household derives income from renting out capital and labor to ﬁrms, pays taxes on
its factor income, and receives government lump sum transfers. It maximizes its utility stream
subject to a sequence of ﬂow budget constraints. The ﬂow budget constraint in period v is given
as:














Nv + Wv (7)
where Lv denotes household spending on new capital, q
v is the labor income tax rate, Zv is the
real wage, n
v is the capital income tax rate, uv is the capital rental rate, xn
v is the capital capacity
utilization rate, Nv is the household’s holdings of capital, and Wv denotes the household’s receipts
of government lump sum transfers. The household budget constraint assumes that households
receive a capital tax credit on normal depreciation expenditures.



























denotes the eect of variations
in the capital utilization rate on the eective rate of depreciation of the capital stock. As in the




n  0,a n dt h a txn (})=[n (1) =
0. The adjustment cost formulation adopted here (and also assumed for consumer durables
in equation (6)) is proposed by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2004) and assumes that
adjustment costs arise when the growth rate of investment deviates from its steady-state level.
There is a continuum of identical competitive ﬁrms. We assume that the production function









where \v denotes output, DA0 is a constant,  5 (0>1) is the elasticity of output to the eective
input of capital services and }v denotes the level of labor augmenting technology. We assume
that the latter grows at the constant rate }  1. Firms rent capital services and labor from the
households at the prices uv and zv.
The government purchases goods from the private sector, Jv, which it ﬁnances with capital
and labor income taxes. It is assumed to run a balanced budget and to transfer any dierences
between its current expenditure and its tax revenue back to the household sector in the form of
lump sum transfers:











We will assume that Jv grows at the constant rate }. Thus, government lump-sum transfers
vary endogenously in response to variations in government tax revenue. Allowing for endogenous
variations in government debt would deliver exactly the same results.12














































where q>n 5 [0>1) are constants that determine the long run unconditional means of the two
tax rates. We follow McGrattan (1994) and allow for an AR(2) structure of the tax processes
with the restriction that |q
1 + q




¯ ¯ ? 1.13
12To be precise, for given sequences of distortionary taxes and government spending, the equilibrium allocations
assuming either endogenous variations in lump-sum transfers keeping government debt constrant or endogenous
variations in government debt keeping lump-sum transfers constrant are identical. This follows from Ricardian
equivalence.
13In the estimation step below, we found it useful to introduce a slightly stronger assumption, namely that q
1,
n
1  0> q
2, n
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16There are two types of innovations to the tax rate processes, unanticipated shocks, %q
v and
%n




v3e where e  1 denotes the anticipation horizon. The
notation pertaining to these innovations indicates that, as of period v,t h et a xr a t e si np e r i o d
v+1are stochastic due to the unanticipated shocks. The anticipated tax shocks to the tax rates
in period v+1on the other hand enter the households’ information set at the time that they are
announced, i.e. in period v  e +1 . This means that at date v, the consumer is informed about
the current period’s surprise tax changes, %q
v and %n
v, and receives new information about the




v+e.W ea s s u m et h a tt h e














. The innovations to the tax rates are allowed to be correlated
but we assume that %v and v3e are orthogonal.
The aggregate resource constraint in the economy is given by:
Fv + Gv + Lv + Jv  \v (13)
Our inclusion of consumer durables, habit formation, and variable capacity utilization in the
home-production sector is potentially important for the response of consumption of nondurables
and services to anticipated changes in taxes during the pre-implementation period. When a
tax cut is announced but not yet implemented, the main channel through which the economy is
aected is through the eect on household wealth. In a model without the aspects just listed, the
wealth eect will tend to be associated with an immediate increase in consumption of nondurables
and services regardless of whether the change in taxes relates to labor income tax rates or capital
income tax rates. Clearly, this prediction is in contrast to the empirical results of Section 2.
Due to habit formation, households are less willing to choose consumption streams that give
rise to sudden changes in consumption. For that reason, habit formation potentially allows for
a smoother increase in consumption during the pre-implementation period. The presence of
durable consumption goods and the complementarity between consumption of nondurables and
consumption of the service ﬂow of the durables stock, implies less tendency for an increase in
nondurables consumption during the pre-implementation period. The reason for this is that the
17drop in savings that occurs due to the wealth eect, depresses consumer durables spending. This
eect is reinforced by variable capacity utilization in the home-production sector. Whether these
aspects allow us match the dynamics of consumption clearly depends on the parameter values
which we will estimate in the next section.
3.2 Estimation
We examine the extent to which the model can account for the VAR evidence on the eects of
tax liability changes in the U.S. that we documented in Section 2. For this purpose we estimate
the parameters describing preferences, technology, and ﬁscal policy.
We adopt the following estimation strategy. We partition the set of parameters into two
subsets: X =[ X0
1>X0
2]
0 where X1 is a vector of parameters that we will calibrate and X2 is a
vector of parameters that we will formally estimate. The vector of parameters that we calibrate
contains those parameters that are either di!cult to estimate econometrically or for which we
believe that there are good grounds for selecting their value through a calibration exercise. We
ﬁrst discuss the calibration of the parameters in X1.
In order to match the frequency of the observed data, we set one model period equal to 3
months. Given this, we calibrate , the subjective discount factor, to match a 3 percent annual
real interest rate. We calibrate $, the preference weight on the disutility of work, so that steady
state hours work are equal to 25 percent. The share parameter  determines households’ expen-
diture on durable consumption goods relative to nondurables and services. This parameter is
calibrated so that durables consumption expenditure accounts for 11.9 percent of total consump-
tion expenditure. This number matches the expenditure share of consumer durables (relative to
total consumption expenditure) in the U.S. in the sample that we studied in Section 2.
We normalize steady state output (divided by the level of labor augmenting technology) to
1 and calibrate the constant D that enters equation (9) to match this normalization. The rate
of labor augmenting technological progress, },i sa s s u m e dt ob ee q u a lt o1 . 0 0 5t om a t c hal o n g
run annual growth rate of the economy equal to approximately 2 percent, the average growth
rate of real per capita U.S. GDP in the post war period. Along the balanced growth path, the
18rates of capacity utilization in the home-production and in the market sector are normalized to
unity. Therefore, y and n denotes the depreciation rates of the two capital stocks along the
balanced growth path. We assume that y = n =0 =025 so that the annual rate of depreciation
at a normal rate of capacity utilization is approximately 10 percent. We set  equal to 36 percent
which produces income shares close to those observed in the U.S.
In order to match our measurement in Section 2, we assume that the announcement horizon
is equal to 6 quarters. Thus, we set the parameter e in equations (11)  (12) equal to 6. Next,
we set the steady state tax rates, q and n, equal to 26 percent and 42 percent, respectively,
These values match the average eective U.S. tax rates for labor and capital income estimated
by Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994). Finally, we assume that tax liability shocks give rise
changes in both the capital income tax rate and in the labor income tax rate and that the two
tax innovations are of equal size. Our motivation for this assumption is that most of the tax
liability changes listed in Table A.1 aect the taxation of both types of income. Ideally, we would
like to discriminate between these two forms of taxation but the tax data do not allow for this.
We will later examine the consequences of this assumption. Table 1 summarizes the calibration
of the vector X1.








¤0 where !y denotes x00
y (}), #y denotes [00
y (})@[0
y (}),
and !y and #y are deﬁned symmetrically.
We estimate this parameter vector by matching the empirical impulse response functions
that we derived in Section 2. However, the model does not give rise to a ﬁnite order VAR
representation of the vector of observables that were included in the empirical VAR. Thus, rather
than matching the exact model based impulse response functions with the empirical impulse
responses, we apply a simulation estimator.14 To be precise, we estimate X2 as the vector of
14See Cogley and Nason (1995) for an early application of such an approach and Kehoe (2006) for a recent
discussion of its advantages.
19variables that solves the following minimization problem:





















W d e n o t e st h e( v e c t o r i z e d )e m p i r i c a lr e s p o n s e st h a tw ea i ma tm a t c h i n g ,\p
W (X2|X1) are
the equivalent estimates from the theoretical model and P
31
g is a weighting matrix. The empirical
responses include the responses of the ﬁve variables in [w for a forecast horizon at W quarters
in response to unanticipated tax liability changes and the responses of [w to the anticipated
tax liability change for N quarters before its implementation until W quarters afterwards. We
set the forecast horizon equal to 24 quarters (as in Section 2) and we allow for 6 quarters of
pre-announcement eects in the case of anticipated tax shocks. We choose the weighting matrix
to be a be a diagonal matrix with the estimates of the inverse of the sampling variance of the
relevant impulse responses along its diagonal.
We calculate the model equivalent of the empirical impulse responses in the following fashion:
1. First, we simulate the model in response to anticipated and unanticipated tax liability
changes. We do this by drawing 100 sequences of tax innovations from observed U.S.
data (with replacement) each for a time-horizon of 228 quarters (which matches the length
of the U.S. data that we use for estimation of the empirical VAR). We then simulate
the economy in response to this sequence of tax innovations. In order to compute the
competitive equilibrium allocation, we ﬁrst make a stationarity inducing transformation of
the economy. We accomplish this by dividing each of the variables that are growing over
time by }w. Next, we log-linearize the ﬁrst order necessary optimality conditions of the
model around the deterministic steady state. The competitive equilibrium is then derived
by solving the resulting set of (log) linear stochastic dierence equations with a standard
numerical method. After this, we convert the simulated time paths of the variables into
their log-levels by adding the log steady-state levels and adding the logarithms of }w (to the
growing variables). This gives us 100 sample paths of the vector [ produced by the model
given the parameter vector X (each of a length of 228 quarters). Denote this collection of
vectors by [m (X2|X1) where m =1 >==>100 denotes the m’th replication.
202. The empirical VAR cannot directly be estimated on this artiﬁcial data due to stochastic
singularity. Therefore, as a second step we add a small amount of measurement error to
[m (X2|X1).L e te [m (X2|X1) denote the resulting artiﬁcial samples of [.


























w and e 
d>m
w+1>w denote the sequences of tax liability shocks that we have drawn for
the j’th replication. From the artiﬁcial VARs we then estimate the model equivalent of the
empirical impulse response functions. Finally, we average the impulse responses over the
100 replications and this gives us the estimate of \p
W (X2|X1).
Following Hall et al (2007) , we compute the standard errors of the vector X2 from an



































where P is the covariance matrix of the impulse responses that we estimated empirically in
Section 2, and Pv is the covariance matrix of the v’th replication of the model based impulse
responses.
4R e s u l t s
Table 2 contains the results of the estimation of X2. We ﬁnd a point estimate of the habit
persistence parameter, , of 0.874 which implies a large eect of past consumption on consumers’
current marginal utility of consumption. This value is very similar to the estimates of e.g. Altig
21et al (2004). The curvature parameter  is estimated to be equal to approximately 2.4 with
a tight conﬁdence interval. The estimate of the adjustment cost parameter !n is 2.4. This
implies moderately high adjustment costs of the capital stock. The adjustment cost parameter
for consumer durables, !n, is estimated to be 3.2. Thus, according to our estimates, it is more
costly to quickly adjust the capital stock in the home-production sector than in the market sector.
Similarly, we ﬁnd that variations in the rate of capital utilization of the stock of durables is more
costly in terms of wear and tear than variations in the capital stock used for the production of
market goods. Our point estimates of these parameters are #n =0 =044 and #y =0 =496.
We ﬁnd that it is important to model the tax processes as second order autoregressive
processes rather than simple ﬁrst order autoregressions. Our point estimates for the labor income
tax process are q
1 =1 =426 and q
2 = 0=427 while those for the capital income tax process are
n
1 =1 =091 and n
2 = 0=221. Figure 5 illustrates the resulting responses of the tax rates to a one
percentage point fall in total tax liabilities. The implied change in the labor income tax rate is
extremely persistent and while the response of the capital income tax rate is much less persistent
with most of the initial change having dissipated 2 years after the change in tax liabilities. Our
estimates of the autoregressive parameters (and therefore of the dynamics of taxes) are extremely
similar to the maximum likelihood estimates of McGrattan (1994) although she ﬁnds an even
higher estimate of q
1 (and a correspondingly lower estimate of q
2).15 The similarity between
our results and those of McGrattan’s (1994) is reassuring given the dierence in the approach to
estimating the parameters of the tax processes.16
Given the parameter set b X, we ﬁnd that the DSGE model constructed in Section 3 accounts
extremely well for almost all the VAR moments of the U.S. data that we estimated in Section
3. In particular, the model economy reproduces the sizes and shapes of the response of the
15McGrattan’s (1994) estimates of these two parameters are q
1 =1 =76 and that q
2 = 0=775. The estimates,
however, are not entirely comparable because McGrattan (1994) allows technology shocks to aect tax rates and
assumes spillovers between the two tax rates.
16McGrattan (1994) estimates the parameters of the tax processes (and other structural parameters) with
maximum likelihood treating the tax rates as observable but the tax shocks as unobservable.
22economy to an unanticipated tax cut, the pre-implementation lump of the economy in response
to an anticipated tax cut, and the size and shapes of the responses to an anticipated tax cut
once implemented.
Figure 6 illustrates the impact of a one percentage point change in tax liabilities for an
unanticipated tax cut (the left column) and an anticipated tax cut (in the right column). In each
of these ﬁgures we illustrate (a) the VAR based impulses that we estimated using U.S. data in
Section 2 (along with their conﬁdence intervals), (b) the VAR based model impulse responses,
and (c) the exact model based impulse responses. The dierence between the latter two impulse
response functions is that the exact impulse responses do not impose the VAR structure but
instead are derived directly from the solution to the model. Our estimation results imply that
there are only minimal dierences between the exact model based impulse responses and the
VAR based model impulse responses.
As in the U.S. data, an unanticipated tax cut sets o a major expansion in the economy
and in no case do the impulse responses generated by the model economy deviate signiﬁcantly
from the empirical estimates for more than a few quarters during the 6 year forecast horizon.
Moreover, as in the U.S. data, the boom in consumption occurs earlier than in output and in
investment. We also ﬁnd a short lived drop in hours worked before it eventually goes above
trend. Importantly, the model is consistent with our empirical ﬁnding that the elasticity of the
investment response is much higher than that of any other variable. The only notable discrepancy
between the empirical impulse responses to the unanticipated tax cut and those of the model
is that consumer durables purchases are less sensitive to the tax cut in the model than in the
data. The theoretical impulse responses, however, are within the 68% conﬁdence intervals of the
empirical impulse responses.
In response to an anticipated tax cut, the model implies a major contraction in output,
investment, and hours worked during the pre-implementation period. The size and timing of
the response of investment in the model economy is as good as identical to the empirical VAR
estimates. The model also accounts very well for the dynamics of hours worked and output in
response to the anticipated tax cut albeit both of these variables go above trend earlier in the
23model economy than in the data.
In the empirical VAR, consumption of both nondurables and services and of durables are
basically ﬂat during the pre-implementation period. The model economy implies a slight increase
in nondurables consumption while durables consumption declines by up to 3 percent in the pre-
implementation period. However, the artiﬁcial impulse responses of both these variables are
within the conﬁdence bands of the empirical impulse responses. Moreover, although the model
economy implies an increase in the consumption of nondurables, the size of the increase is rather
small.
Once taxes are actually cut, the model implies a large expansion in the economy and the
model-based impulse responses are very similar to the empirical VAR estimates apart from too
fast a surge in consumption of nondurables in the model relative to the data. Nevertheless, the
model responses of output, investment, durables consumption, and hours worked are extremely
similar to the VAR responses.
Recall from Figure 2 that, in the U.S. data, the size of the pre-implementation contraction
in output that occurs in response to an anticipated tax cut is smaller the shorter is the assumed
implementation lag. We now examine whether the model in Section 2 is consistent with this. For
that purpose, we compute the impulse response of output varying the parameter e in equations
(11) and (12) from 4 to 10 quarters. We do this using the parameter estimates discussed above.
The result is illustrated in Figure 7 and we see that the model produces exactly the same result as
the empirical VAR: The shorter is the anticipation horizon, the smaller is the pre-implementation
contraction of output while the post-implementation expansion of output is basically unaltered.
Therefore, the DSGE model presented in Section 2 appears to be very well suited for explain-
ing how changes in tax liabilities ae c tt h ee c o n o m y .N o to n l yi st h em o d e la b l et oa c c o u n tf o r
t h ei m p a c to fu n a n t i c i p a t e dt a xs h o c k s ,b u ti ta l s oc a na c c o u n tf o rt h ec o n t r a c t i o ni nt h ee c o n -
omy that occurs during the pre-implementation period in response to anticipated tax liability
changes that we documented in the U.S. data.
244.1 Sensitivity Analysis
We now examine the extent to which the results depend on our modeling assumptions. We start
by turning our attention to the impact of anticipated tax cuts on the consumption proﬁle. As we
have seen above, the model is quite successful in accounting for the ﬂat consumption response
during the pre-implementation period. This result goes against standard intuition and we now
wish to bring out the sources of this feature of the model.
A key aspect of the model is the presence of consumer durables. Row (2) of Table 2 reports
the parameter estimates of X2 when we exclude consumer durables from the model. In this
case, we estimate the structural parameters by matching the moments of a version of the VAR
in equation (1) in which the vector of endogenous variables, [w, does not include the purchases
of consumer durables. There is little eect of excluding consumer durables on the estimated
structural parameters apart from an increase in the estimated sensitivity of the depreciation rate
of the capital stock to changes in the capacity utilization rate of the capital stock. Figure 8 shows
the resulting impulse response functions along with those of the alternative empirical VAR. The
model that abstracts from consumer durables still ﬁts the response of output, investment and
hours worked very well albeit the performance is marginally worse that the benchmark model.
However, while the benchmark model can account quite well for the ﬂat response of consumption
to an anticipated tax cut during the pre-implementation period, the model without durables leads
to a steady increase in consumption of nondurables and services during the pre-implementation
period. The reason for this dierence is that consumption of durables has a tendency to fall
in response to the anticipated tax cut due to the implied fall in savings. The fall in purchases
of durables is associated with a moderation of the tendency for an increase in consumption of
nondurables because the two consumption goods are assumed to be complements. Row (3) of
Table 2 re-introduces consumer durables into the model but restricts the capacity utilization rate
of durables, xy
w,t ob ec o n s t a n ti ne q u a t i o n s(5)  (6).T h i sr e s t r i c t i o nh a sl i t t l ei m p a c to nt h e
estimated parameters but, as shown in Figure 9, it implies a slightly less good ﬁt of the response
of consumption to the anticipated tax cut than the benchmark model. The reason for this is
that the capacity utilization rate of the durables stock exacerbates the fall in consumer durables
25during the pre-implementation period.
Another important aspect of the model in terms of the consumption response to tax changes
is that we allow for habit formation. The presence of habits leads consumers to smooth the path
of consumption in response to changes in taxes. Table 2, Row (4) reports the estimates of X2
and Figure 10 illustrates the resulting impulse responses when we restrict the habit parameter
to be equal to zero,  =0 . This restriction leads to an increase in the estimated curvature
parameter, , and an increase in the persistence of the tax processes. Most importantly, in
the absence of habits, the model accounts much less well for the response of consumption to
both types of tax changes, see Figure 9. In particular, in response to an unanticipated tax
cut, consumption rises almost upon impact and no longer reproduces the steady increasing
pattern that we observe in the data. In response to an anticipated tax cut, consumption is
basically unaected throughout the anticipation period but then rises immediately when taxes
are eventually cut. Thus, the introduction of consumer durables and habits is essential in terms
of accounting for the consumption dynamics.
In our benchmark model we assumed that lump-sum taxes respond to the changes in gov-
ernment tax revenue while government consumption grows at a constant rate. We now examine
whether the results are fundamentally aected by assuming that the change in government rev-
enue is absorbed by government spending rather than lump-sum taxes. Row (5) of Table 2 reports
the parameter estimates under this alternative set of assumptions and Figure 11 illustrates the
resulting impulse response functions. The main eect of this change in the model is that the
estimated persistence of the tax processes declines while households’ willingness to substitute
consumption over time increases (due to a fall in the value of ). However, the response of the
economy to the two types of tax shocks is very similar to the benchmark model. Thus, it appears
that this modeling aspect matters little for the results. This is perhaps a little bit surprising but
is due to the fact that the response of the economy to changes in marginal taxes much dominates
the response to changes in government purchases of goods and services.
Yang (2005) considers the eects of anticipated changes in labor and capital income tax
rates separately. Assuming an anticipation horizon of 4 quarters, she shows that in response
26to an anticipated cut in the labor tax rate, consumption rises during the pre-implementation
period while output, investment and hours worked contract; in response to an anticipated cut
in the capital income tax rate instead, the opposite pattern is implied. These results obviously
dier fundamentally with ours since we ﬁnd a ﬂat response of consumption during the pre-
implementation period which matches the VAR estimates for the U.S. economy derived in Section
2.
We have already discussed above how the consumption response to anticipated tax changes
depend on the existence of consumer durables, variable capacity utilization and on the presence
of habit formation. We now also examine whether our results depend critically on whether the
tax changes aect labor income taxation or capital income taxation. Row (6) of Table 2 reports
the parameter estimates when we assume that the tax liability cut leaves capital income taxes
unaected while Row (7) reports the alternative case with a constant labor income tax. The
most notable impact on the estimated parameters is that the capital adjustment cost parameter,
!n, becomes extremely high when we assume that the tax liability change aects only capital
income taxes. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the AR(2) coe!cients of the tax processes are equal to
zero in both cases.
Figures 12 and 13 report the resulting impulse response functions. We ﬁnd that the bench-
mark model in which both tax rates are aected by the tax liability change outperforms either
of the two alternative scenarios. When the capital income tax rate is held constant, the model
accounts less well for the surge in investment following a cut in tax (regardless of whether the
tax cut is anticipated or not) and implies a steady increase in consumption during the pre-
implementation period in response to an anticipated tax cut. When the labor income tax rate is
held constant, we ﬁnd that an anticipated tax cut sets o increases in investment and in hours
worked during the pre-implementation period, responses that are in contrast to the contractions
in investment and hours worked that we estimate in the data. These responses are consistent
with the results of Yang (2005). Thus, it appears that our assumption that tax liability changes
aect both labor income taxes and capital income taxes is important since it allows us to ﬁt both
the consumption response and the impact on hours worked and on investment.
275 Tax Shocks and the Business Cycle
The empirical evidence of Section 2 regarding the eects of tax liability shocks, and the fact that
the DSGE model proposed in Section 3 can account very successfully for the dynamic eects
of tax policy shocks, makes it interesting to ask whether these shocks are important impulses
to the U.S. business cycle. We now turn to this question which we address on the basis of
counterfactual experiments. In particular, we use the empirical VAR estimates to simulate the
time paths of the output, consumption, investment and hours worked that would have occurred
had tax shocks been the only shocks to the economy. We ﬁrst simulate the VAR when setting
hw = d
w+l>w =0 . In this case, all the variations in [w (around its trend) are due unanticipated
tax shocks. Next, we simulate the VAR when setting hw = x
w =0in which case the ﬂuctuations
in [w are due to anticipated tax shocks only. Finally, we simulate the VAR considering both
types of tax shocks. We Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter the resulting artiﬁcial time series and compare
the counterfactual results with the actual Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered U.S. time series.17
The results are presented in Figure 14. Panel A shows the results for unanticipated tax shocks,
Panel B reports the case of anticipated tax shocks, and Panel C shows the results when we allow
for both types of tax shocks. From Panel A we see that the Revenue Acts of 1962 and 1964
explain much of the expansion output, in private sector nondurables and services consumption,
and in private sector real investments in the mid 1960’s. Moreover, the Revenue Act of 1971
accounts for a substantial fraction of the pre-OPEC I expansion in the early 1970’s. Finally, the
Bush tax cuts of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 provided a major
boost to the economy in the mid 2000’s.
Panel B illustrates the impact of anticipated tax liability changes. The results indicate that
the Reagan tax initiative (the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981) and the Social Security
Amendments of 1977 were instrumental for understanding the ﬂuctuations in the economy in
the early 1980’s. The latter, which included a major anticipated tax increase in 1981, helped
boosting the economy prior to its implementation while the former, which was associated with
17We use a value of 1600 for the smoothing parameter.
28major anticipated tax cuts, depressed from late 1981 up till the end of 1983. When the tax
increase associated with the Social Security Amendments of 1977 was eventually implemented
in 1981, it reinforced the contractionary eects of the anticipated Reagan tax cuts. As the
Reagan tax cut was implemented through 1982 to 1984 it boosted the economy. Together, these
anticipated tax cuts therefore boosted the economy prior to 1981, led to a severe contraction from
late 1981 to late 1983, and helped the economy recover thereafter. Our results therefore indicate
that the early 1980’s recession was mainly ﬁscal in nature rather than due to tight monetary
policy during the Volcker monetary regime. Finally, we ﬁnd that the Economic Growth and
Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001 (signed in June 2001, implemented in the ﬁrst quarter of 2002)
provided a major stimulus to the economy after their implementation.
Panel C shows the total contribution of tax liability changes to the U.S. business cycle. The
combination of the two tax liability shocks accounts quite well for the U.S. business cycle and
tax shocks appear non-trivial as impulses to the business cycle. Over the sample period that we
study, the standard deviation of (Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered) output is 1.62 percent. The standard
deviation of the counterfactual series when we feed in the two types of tax policy shocks is 0.70
percent and the cross-correlation between these two time-series is 53 percent. The standard
deviation of the counterfactual investment time series when we allow for both types of two
shocks is 2.65 percent which corresponds to approximately 47 percent of the standard deviation
of the actual time series for investment (5.59 percent).
Thus, our results are supportive of Braun (1994) and McGrattan (1994) who ﬁnd that tax
shocks are important impulses to the U.S. business cycles. Our analysis has added to this
literature three main ﬁndings. First, empirically it is relevant to distinguish between anticipated
and unanticipated tax shocks. Secondly, anticipated tax cuts (increases) are associated with
a major contraction (boom) in the economy prior to their implementation. Thirdly, economy
theory can account very well for the aggregate eects of anticipated as well as unanticipated tax
shocks.
296C o n c l u s i o n s
We have provided empirical evidence on the aggregate eects of U.S. tax liability changes. Based
on Romer and Romer’s (2007a) narrative account of U.S. ﬁscal policy shocks, we made a dis-
tinction between anticipated and unanticipated tax liability changes based on the time dierence
between the dates at which tax liability changes were signed by the President and the dates at
which the tax liability changes were due. Using a VAR methodology we showed that the imple-
mentation of a tax liability cut gives rise to major expansion in the economy which manifests
itself as increases in output, consumption, investment and hours worked. The expansionary ef-
fects of tax liability cuts arise regardless of whether it is anticipated or unanticipated. However,
during the pre-implementation period of an anticipated tax cut, we ﬁnd a major contraction in
output, investment and hours worked. In other words, there is overwhelming evidence in favor
of anticipation eects of tax policy interventions. The anticipation eect is particularly large
for investment in capital goods while there is little impact on consumption of nondurables and
services.
We showed that economic theory can account for the empirically estimated impulse responses.
In particular, we construct a DSGE model that is consistent with both the ﬁnding that pre-
announced tax cuts are contractionary in the pre-implementation period, and with the ﬁnding
that once taxes are cut (regardless of whether the tax cut is anticipated or not), the economy
moves into an expansionary phase relatively quickly. Moreover, in line with the empirical esti-
mates, the model implies large eects of tax cuts on private sector investment and more muted
response of private sector consumption of nondurables and services. Fundamental for our ability
to account for the eects of pre-announced tax changes is the fact that we introduce consumption
of durable goods, that we allow for variable capacity utilization, that we introduce habit forma-
tion, and that we assume that tax liability changes give rise to changes in both labor income tax
rates and in capital income tax rates.
We argue that tax liability changes are empirically relevant as impulses to the U.S. business
cycle. We show that tax liability changes can account for around 43 percent of the standard
30deviation of output at the business cycle frequencies during the sample period that we consider
which covers most of the post-WWII period. This is an important result since it implies that
such shocks should be observe more attention in the business cycle literature. Moreover, we
argue that anticipation eects are also empirically relevant. In particular, we ﬁnd that the early
1980’s recession to a large extent can be accounted for by the recessionary eects of anticipated
future tax cuts. Therefore, we believe that tax shocks should receive more attention in the
business cycle literature and that it is important to take into account that ﬁscal shocks often are
associated with important implementation lags.
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33Table A.1: Tax Liability Changes
Name Signed Eective Type Size
1. Social Security Amendments of 1947 August 1947 1950 Q1 Anticipated 0.27
2. Revenue Act of 1948 April 1948 1948 Q2 Surprise -3.74
April 1948 1948 Q3 Surprise 1.82
3. Social Security Amendments of 1950 August 1950 1954 Q1 Anticipated 0.35
4. Expiration of Excess Proﬁts and October 1951 1954 Q1 Anticipated -0.35
Temporary Income Tax
5. Internal Revenue Code of 1954 August 1954 1954 Q3 Surprise -1.13
August 1954 1954 Q4 Surprise 0.72
6. Tax Rate Extension Act of 1958 June 1958 1958 Q3 Surprise -0.11
7. Social Security Amendments of 1958 August 1958 1960 Q1 Anticipated 0.36
8. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1959 September 1959 1959 Q4 Surprise 0.12
9. Social Security Amendments of 1961 Jun 1961 1963 Q1 Anticipated 0.33
10. Changes in Depreciation Guidelines July 1962 1962 Q3 Surprise -0.68
and Revenue Act of 1962 July 1962 1962 Q4 Surprise 0.45
October 1962 1962 Q4 Surprise -0.61
October 1962 1963 Q1 Surprise 0.45
October 1962 1963 Q1 Surprise 0.10
11. Revenue Act of 1964 February 1964 1964 Q2 Surprise -2.55
February 1964 1964 Q3 Anticipated 1.25
February 1964 1965 Q1 Anticipated -0.65
12. Excise Tax Reduction of 1965 June 1965 1965 Q3 Surprise -0.24
June 1965 1966 Q1 Anticipated -0.23
13. Tax Adjustment Act of 1966 March 1966 1966 Q2 Surprise 0.12
14. Public Law 90-26 June 1967 1967 Q3 Surprise -0.66
June 1967 1967 Q4 Anticipated 0.46
15. Social Security Amendments of 1967 January 1967 1971 Q1 Anticipated -0.33
34Table A.1 continued
Name Signed Eective Type Size
16. Tax Reform Act of 1969 December 1969 1971 Q1 Anticipated -0.09
December 1969 1972 Q1 Anticipated -0.09
17. Reform of Depreciation Rules January 1971 1971 Q1 Surprise -0.25
18. Revenue Act of 1971 December 1971 1972 Q1 Surprise -1.23
December 1971 1972 Q2 Anticipated 0.55
19. 1972 Changes to Social Security October 1972 1978 Q1 Anticipated 0.13
20. Tax Reform Act of 1976 October 1976 1976 Q4 Surprise 0.13
October 1976 1977 Q1 Surprise -0.04
21. Social Security Amendments of 1977 December 1977 1979 Q1 Anticipated 0.36
December 1977 1980 Q1 Anticipated 0.06
December 1977 1981 Q1 Anticipated 0.56
December 1977 1982 Q1 Anticipated 0.05
22. Revenue Act of 1978 November 1978 1979 Q1 Surprise -0.77
23. Crude Oil Windfall Proﬁt April 1980 1980 Q2 Surprise 0.30
Tax Act of 1980 April 1980 1981 Q1 Anticipated 0.13
April 1980 1982 Q1 Anticipated 0.13
24. Economic Recovery Tax Act August 1981 1981 Q3 Surprise -0.84
of 1981 August 1981 1981 Q4 Surprise 0.56
August 1981 1982 Q1 Anticipated -1.53
August 1981 1983 Q1 Anticipated -1.69
August 1981 1984 Q1 Anticipated -1.28
25. Tax Equity and Fiscal September 1982 1983 Q1 Anticipated 0.78
Responsibility Act of 1982
35Name Signed Eective Type Size
26. Social Security Amendments April 1983 1984 Q1 Anticipated 0.32
of 1983 April 1983 1985 Q1 Anticipated 0.21
April 1983 1986 Q1 Anticipated 0.10
April 1983 1988 Q1 Anticipated 0.31
April 1983 1990 Q1 Anticipated 0.18
27. Deﬁcit Reduction Act of 1984 July 1984 1984 Q3 Surprise 0.20
28. Tax Reform Act of 1986 October 1986 1986 Q4 Surprise 0.50
October 1986 1987 Q1 Surprise -0.31
October 1986 1987 Q3 Anticipated -0.42
29. Omnibus Budget Reconcialiation December 1987 1988 Q1 Surprise 0.22
Act of 1987
30. Omnibus Budget Reconcialiation November 1990 1991 Q1 Surprise 0.60
Act of 1990
31. Omnibus Budget Reconcialiation August 1993 1993 Q3 Surprise 1.02
Act of 1993 August 1993 1993 Q4 Surprise 0.59
August 1993 1994 Q1 Anticipated 0.19
32. Tax Payer Relief Act and August 1997 2000 Q1 Anticipated 0.02
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 August 1997 2002 Q1 Anticipated 0.01
33. Economic Growth and Tax Relief June 2001 2002 Q1 Anticipated -0.80
Reconciliation Act of 2001
34. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief May 2003 2003 Q3 Surprise -2.86
Reconciliation Act of 2003 May 2003 2004 Q3 Anticipated 1.70
May 2003 2005 Q1 Anticipated 0.56
Source: Romer and Romer, 2007a and Bureau of Economic Analysis. Tax liability changes with
more than 90 days dierence between the signing of the legislation and their implementation
are classiﬁed as anticipated tax liability changes. Sizes are measured by the implied tax liability
impact divided by that quarter’s current price GDP at the annual rate.
36Table A.2: Deﬁnitions of Variables
Variable Deﬁnition Source
Output Nominal GDP divided by its implicit deﬂator and by Bureau of Economic Analysis
population
Consumption Consumers nominal expenditure on non-durables Bureau of Economic Analysis
divided by its deﬂator and expenditure on services
divided by its deﬂator and by population
Durables Consumers nominal expenditure on durables Bureau of Economic Analysis
Purchases divided by its deﬂator and by population
Investment Sum of private sector gross investment divided by Bureau of Economic Analysis
its deﬂator and government investment
divided by its deﬂator. The sum is divided by population.
Hours worked Product of hours per worker and civilian non-farm Bureau of Economic Analysis
employment divided by population combined with and Francis and Ramey
Francis and Ramey (2002) hours worked series. (2002)
Population Population above 16 years of age Bureau of Labor Statistics
37Table 1: Baseline Calibration
Calibrated parameters
Parameter Value
1   0=64 The elasticity of output to hours worked
 1=0330=25 Subjective discount factor
 0=025 Steady-state depreciation rate
n 0=42 Steady-state capital income tax rate
 q 0=26 Steady-state labor income tax rate
Table 2: Estimation Results
Parameter





(1) Benchmark 2.421 0.874 2.430 0.044 3.239 0.496 1.426 -0.427 1.091 -0.221
(0.228) (0.109) (0.130) (0.008) (0.454) (0.312) (0.138) (0.134) (0.205) (0.262)
(2) No durables 2.543 0.883 2.321 0.089 - - 1.479 -0.480 1.196 -0.294
(0.191) (0.089) (0.233) (0.015) (0.181) (0.191) (0.197) (0.205)
(3) Fixed utilization 2.363 0.907 2.481 0.064 4.189 - 1.469 -0.469 1.200 -0.315
of durables (0.191) (0.071) 0.203) (0.010) (0.540) (0.158) (0.170) (0.201) (0.193)
(4) No habits 4.092 - 3.238 0.079 4.290 0.198 1.538 -0.539 1.318 -0.396
(0.377) (0.186) (0.025) (0.494) (0.105) (0.134) (0.091) (0.192) (0.128)
(5) Variable governm. 1.328 0.900 1.716 0.022 1.846 0.128 1.107 -0.108 0.829 0W
spending (0.121) (0.055) (0.057) (0.003) (0.109) (0.042) (0.102) (0.247) (0.091)
(6) Fixed capital tax 1.334 0.918 2.062 0.275 2.558 1.553 0.999W 0W --
(0.076) (0.059) 0.064) (0.030) (0.196) (0.412)
(7) Fixed labor tax 1W 0.741 178.65 0.149 1.687 0.056 - - 0.973 0W
(0.016) (141.66) (0.022) (0.108) (0.021) (0.026)
Standard errors are given in the parentheses.



























































Figure 1: Tax Liability ChangesUnanticipated Tax Shock Anticipated Tax Shock






















































































































































































Figure 2: The Responses to Tax Shocks in the U.S.
(anticipated tax shocks are announced at date -6 and implemented at date 0)

























Figure 3: The Eects of Anticipated Tax Cuts for Alternative Anticipation Horizons.




































































Figure 5: The Dynamics of Taxes in the Model EconomyUnanticipated Tax Shock Anticipated Tax Shock






















































































































































































Figure 6: The Impulse Responses of the Benchmark Model (full drawn lines: empirical IRs,
dotted lines: the exact model IRs, lines with circles: the model IRs imposing a VAR)

























Figure 7: The Dependence of the Dynamics of Output on the Anticipation
Lag in the Model
44Unanticipated Tax Shock Anticipated Tax Shock
















































































































































Figure 8: The Model with no Durable Consumption Goods
45Unanticipated Tax Shock Anticipated Tax Shock






















































































































































































Figure 9: The Model with Fixed Utilization Rate in Home-Production
46Unanticipated Tax Shock Anticipated Tax Shock






















































































































































































Figure 10: The Model with no Habit Formation
47Unanticipated Tax Shock Anticipated Tax Shock






















































































































































































Figure 11: The Model with Endogenous Government Spending
48Unanticipated Tax Shock Anticipated Tax Shock






















































































































































































Figure 12: The Model with Constant Capital Income Taxes
49Unanticipated Tax Shock Anticipated Tax Shock






















































































































































































Figure 13: The Model with Constant Labor Income Taxes
50A. Surprise Tax Changes B. Anticipated Tax Changes


































































































































Figure 14: Actual and Counterfactual Time Series
(the thin lines show the actual time series, the thick lines show the counterfactual time series,
all time series have been HP-ﬁltered; Shaded areas indicate NBER recessions)
51C. All Tax Changes

































































Figure 14: Actual and Counterfactual Time Series
(the thin lines show the actual time series, the thick lines show the counterfactual time series,
all time series have been HP-ﬁltered; Shaded areas indicate NBER recessions)
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